Liability of a Parent Corporation for the Debts of its Subsidiary by Yost, Robert W.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 3 
January 1936 
Liability of a Parent Corporation for the Debts of its Subsidiary 
Robert W. Yost 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Yost, Liability of a Parent Corporation for the Debts of its Subsidiary, 21 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 234 
(1936). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss3/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
does not seem to be of great aid. Though in view of these cases
it perhaps might be said that Missouri seems to be in accord with
the majority view and will thus hold to be immaterial, in cases
involving drivers' licenses, the fact that the driver had no license,
unless a casaul connection with the accident can be shown.
It does seem, however, that if the purpose of such ordinances
is to be fully carried out the father should be held liable if he
knowingly permits a member of his family to use his car when
they do not have a driver's license. The purpose seems to be to
deny the use of the streets to negligent and incompetent drivers,
and such can only properly be carried out by strict enforcement
of the rules. Wilfully and knowingly becoming a party to the
violation of such a statute might well constitute such negligence
as is by the direct sequence of events the proximate cause of any
damage that may be sustained by another, when the other ele-
ments of actionable negligence are established.
PHILIP A. MAXEINER, '36.
LIABILITY OF A PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE
DEBTS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY
1.
"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its
very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created. Among the most im-
portant are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed,
individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of in-
dividuals are considered the same, and may act as a single indi-
vidual . . . . By these means, a perpetual succession of indi-
viduals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular
object, like one immortal being." This is the now classic defini-
tion of a corporation by John Marshall in the Dartmouth College
Case.' To those who do not have a fairly good idea of the nature
of a corporation before they read it, this so-called definition is
probably unintelligible. But to those lawyers and students of
law who have become accustomed to the legal fictions in which
the reasoning of courts is so often enshrouded, it expresses that
very old concept of a corporation as something separate and dis-
tinct from the persons composing it, as something with an in-
dividuality and personality of its own.
causal connection with the accident. This case held that the fact that such
chauffeur was negligent or incompetent must still be proven by the plaintiff.
14 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629.
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The exact nature of this personality has been a very fertile
field of controversy among the legal philosophers. Mr. Machen
in his article, "Corporate Personality," 24 Har. L. R. 253, sets
forth the various theories and then demonstrates why he believes
them to be inaccurate and confusing. In attempting to clarify
the situation Mr. Machen explains what he believes is the sound
theory, to the following effect. In the first place, a corporation
is not some immortal, spiritual being conjured up by legal magic
but is simply an association of real persons for the carrying on of
some enterprise. It is in that respect similar to the church, the
labor union, the social club, the partnership and joint stock com-
pany, and the state. In the second place, the so-called corporate
entity is simply an instance of that natural and inevitable con-
cept of the human mind which treats a group as something dis-
tinct from the sum of its members, or a whole as different from
the sum of its parts. All groups of persons, such as those already
mentioned, are considered as unities, and each is given a name
to distinguish it from its members.
The corporate entity being merely a thought concept and as
such no different from other group entities, how is it distin-
guishable? What constitutes the individuality and personality
of a corporation? According to Mr. Machen and most of the
writers on the subject the peculiar characteristic of the corporate
entity is that the law recognizes it and attaches legal rights and
and duties to it, as though it were a real person, whereas the law
does not so recognize other group entities. It is true that courts
speak of the corporate entity in language similar to that of John
Marshall, and in that respect do give legal recognition to a con-
cept existing in the minds of the people. But it seems clear that
the legal corporate entity is just as fictional as the lay corporate
entity. How can the law confer rights and impose duties upon "an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law"? Surely it is obvious that the law can act effec-
tively only on real persons. Therefore it seems to the writer
that corporations must be distinguished from other group entities
by the difference in the legal rights and liabilities attaching to
the members of the group. Among the most important are (1)
the capacity of the group to act as a unit and under a common
name for the purpose of holding and transferring title to prop-
erty, making contracts, suing and being sued, and other inci-
dents of the enterprise; (2) the ability of the members to with-
draw from the group and of new members to enter it without
disturbing the continuity of the enterprise; (3) the personal
immunity of the members from the liabilities of the association
except to the extent of their capital contribution thereto; (4) the
necessity of conducting the enterprise through a prescribed form
of organization and procedure, i. e. the members of the group
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss3/6
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in meeting assembled elect the directors of the enterprise, who
as a board formulate the policy and appoint officers to 'carry itout, etc. When the courts speak of corporate entity, they mean
the sum total of the legal incidents of conducting an enterprise
in corporate form.
II.
A doctrine has been developing that in exceptional circum-
stances the courts will "disregard the corporate entity." From
the above discussion it will be inferred that by "disregarding
the corporate entity" the courts mean they will not give effect
to one or more of the normal legal incidents of an incorporated
association. In the usual case of disregarding the corporate
entity the stockholders are held personally responsible for the
obligations of the corporation, whereas normally they are im-
mune from such obligations. Professor Wormser in his article,
"Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity," 12 Cal. L. R. 496,
classifies the exceptional circumstances in which courts have
been prone to apply the doctrine. (1) One of the situations is
where debtors form a corporation and transfer to it all their
assets, thereby attempting to defraud their creditors. The courts
however allow the creditor to pursue the assets as the property
of the debtor, even though the title has passed to the corpora-
tion.2 Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank, 58 Kan. 43. (2) A
second situation is where persons under existing contract obliga-
tions form a corporation and cause it to do that which they were
bound not to do. Such persons will be held liable for the breach
of their contract even though the acts were those of the corpora-
tion.3 Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490. (3) Another situation is
where the corporation is used to accomplish a fraud or other
tort.4 The persons so using the corporation will be held responsi-
ble for the wrong. Clark v. Millsap, 197 Calif. 765. (4) A simi-
lar situation is where persons use a corporation to accomplish
what would amount t6 a crime or evasion of a statute if done by
2 Booth v. Bunce (1865) 33 N. Y. 139. In Re Rieger, Kapner, & Altmark
(1907) 157 Fed. 609; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis & N. 0. Transp. Co.(1882) 13 Fed. 516; Montgomery Webb & Co. v. Dienelt (1890) 133 Pa. St.
585; Ist Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Trebein (1898) 59 Oh. St. 316; Donovan V.
Purtell (1929) 216 Ill. 629; Bremen Savings Bank v. Branch (1891) 104
Mo. 425; Lush v. Riggs (1902) 65 Neb. 258; Terhune v. Hackensack Sav-
ings Bank (1889) 45 N. J. Eq. 344; Andres v. Morgan (1900) 62 Oh. St. 236;
Bennett v. Minott (1896) 28 Ore. 339; Vance v. McNabb Coal Co. (1892)
92 Tenn. 47.
3 Beal v. Chase (1875) 31 Mich. 490; Booth & Co. v. Seibold (1902) 37
Misc. 101; Kramer v. Old (1896) 119 N. C. 1; Higgins v. Calif. Petroleum
& Asphalt Co. (1898) 122 Cal. 373; Cf. People's Pleasure Park Co. v.
Rohleder (1909) 109 Va. 439.
4 Meily v. London & Lancanshire Fire Ins. Co. (1906) 148 Fed. 683;
Kirkpatrick v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co. (1905) 92 N. Y. S. 466; Felsenthal
Co. v. Northern Assur. Co. (1918) 284 Ill. 343.
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them personally, including the formation of illegal monopolies.-
Here again the courts do not tolerate the defense that the corpo-
ration and not its members committed the wrong.6 U. S. v. Mil-
waukee Refrigerator Transit Co. 142 Fed. 247. (5) Finally there
is the situation where a corporation is said to be the mere instru-
mentality of a single stockholder, whether person7 or another
corporation. In such cases the courts hold the controlling person
or corporation responsible for the obligations of the controlled
corporation. The William Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35.
When the state has conferred on stockholders immunity from
the liabilities of the corporation, what explanation do the courts
offer for ignoring such immunity in these exceptional circum-
stances? The prevalent theory seems to be that the privilege of
doing business in a corporate capacity, with its accompanying
advantages, is conferred only to enable persons to carry on a
legitimate enterprise in a legitimate way. So if a corporation is
used to carry on an unlawful enterprise, or to carry on a lawful
enterprise in an unlawful way, then the persons so using it
cannot claim the accompanying advantages." Professor Wormser
says that the corporate entity is a legal fiction and "all fictions
of law are introduced for the purpose of convenience and to sub-
serve the ends of justice. When they are urged to an intent and
purpose not within the reason and policy of the fiction, they
must be disregarded by the courts."
One of the largest groups of cases in which courts speak of
"disregarding the corporate entity" is the fifth group mentioned
above, that is, when one corporation is said to be the "mere
instrumentality" of another corporation. The courts do not al-
ways use the word "instrumentality," but often use some equiva-
lent such as "agency," "adjunct," "dummy," "puppet," etc. The
general rule applied in this group of cases is well stated by the
court in the case of Radio Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Electric
and Manufacturing Co., 7 Fed. (2) 432: "Where stock control
has been resorted to not for the purpose of participating in the
affairs of the corporation in the normal and usual manner, but
for the purpose of controlling the company so that it may be used
as a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning cornpany,
5 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 582; State
v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 Oh. St. 137; Ford v. Chicago Milk Shipper's
Union (1895) 155 Ill. 166; Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (1895)
156 Il1. 448.
6 Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder (1935) 79 Fed. (2) 263; U. S. v.
Lehigh Valley Ry. (1911) 31 S. Ct. 387; U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery
Co. (1916) 234 Fed. 127.
7Wenben Estate v. Hewlett (1924) 193 Cal. 675; Wood Estate v.
Chanslor (1930) 286 Pac. 1001; Phoenix Safety Inv. Co. v. James (1925)
28 Ariz. 514.
8 See Canfield, Scope & Limits of Corp. Entity Theory, 17 Col. L. Rev.
128; Powell, Parent & Subsidiary Corps., secs. 1 & 2.
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courts will look through the screen of separate corporate control
and place the responsibility where it actually belongs," in the
owning company.9 This is the rule with which this article is
mainly concerned.
The mere statement that one corporation might be responsible
for the obligations of another controlled by it sufficiently stresses
the importance of the subject to one who is familiar with the
fact that today the large majority of corporations are either
controlled or controlling corporations. As an illustration of this
fact Berle and Means, in their recent book, "Modern Corporations
and Private Property," state on page 205 that out of the 573
corporations listed in the N. Y. Stock Exchange 92 were pure
holding companies, 395 were both holding and operating com-
panies, and only 86 were operating companies. A holding or
parent company is "any company which is in a position to con-
trol or materially to influence the management of one or more
other companies, by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership
of securities in the other company or companies."' 0 A "pure"
holding company is one whose only purpose is to control the
policies of the companies whose stock it holds, and whose income
is derived from their operations. The large number of holding
companies, however, are operating companies also, and their
control of other companies is incidental to their main purpose.
The companies which are owned and controlled by the holding
companies are called subsidiaries.11
Before entering into a discussion of the so-called instrumen-
tality rule, it is well to define the exact scope of the discussion.
First, it must be noted that the authorities on the subject have
placed the "instrumentality situation" in a class by itself, thereby
indicating their opinion that it is different from the other four
situations where corporate entity is disregarded. In the other
situations the corporate entity is apparently being used by its
stockholders as a shield to protect themselves from the legal
consequences of their own wrongful conduct. It makes no differ-
ence in such cases whether the stockholders are persons or other
corporations. Therefore a parent corporation might be held
liable when it usesits subsidiary in such ways, i. e., to defraud
creditor, to evade an existing contract obligation, or to commit
a tort or crime. Such instances of liability are not within the
scope of this article. Second, the instrumentality rule might
be applied both in criminal and civil cases ;12 It might also be
9 See also, Ross v. Penn. Ry. (1930) 106 N. J. Law 536.
10 Bonbright & Means, The Holding Co., p. 10.21 Bonbright & Means, The Holding Co., p. 10, etc.; Burchett, Corporation
Finance, Chap. 17.
12 See Cases under note 6. Bishop v. U. S. (1926) 16 Fed. (2) 410.
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used to solve procedural as well as substantive law problems. 13
This article is limited to a discussion of the cases involving the
substantive law liability of a parent corporation for the civil
obligations of its subsidiary. Third, there are a large number
of cases involving parent and subsidiary corporations in which
the courts by way of dicta speak of disregarding the corporate
entity, but the actual basis of the decisions against the parent
corporation is that the liability was incurred directly by the
parent, either because of estoppel or because the parent acted
through its own agents, rather than through the subsidiary.'14
Sometimes it is very difficult to decide whether a particular de-
cision was based on estoppel or on the instrumentality rule, and
because of such difficulty, a few cases which perhaps could have
been decided on the theory of estoppel have been included in
the following discussion of the instrumentality rule. 5 Except
for these, all cases in which the liability of the parent was di-
rectly incurred are beyond the scope of this article. Finally, the
primary purpose of this article is to ascertain, if possible, the
meaning of the word "instrumentality" as it is used in the in-
strumentality rule. The question is then, when is a subsidiary
corporation a "mere instrumentality" of the parent corporation
so as to make the parent vicariously responsible for the civil
obligations of the subsidiary?
III.
To find an answer to the question the writer has surveyed
the cases in the United States wherein the rule was applied, and
also those wherein the court refused to apply it. This survey
led first of all to the conclusion that the courts have not yet
defined in so many words just what they mean by "instrumen-
tality." Therefore the only way to discover what they mean is
to study the factual set-up and the decision of each case. This
method is far from satisfactory because many of the cases did not
set forth the facts in sufficient detail to be of any help,16 and
ISGoodwin v. N. Y. Ry. (1903) 124 Fed. 358; Industrial Research v.
General Motors (1928) 29 Fed. (2) 623; Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal
(1908) 211 U. S. 293.
14Abney v. Belmont Country Club Properties (1929) 279 Pac. 829. In
Re Culhane's Estate (1934) 256 N. W. 807; Gulf Coast & S. F. Ry. v. Cities
Service Co. (1922) 281 Fed. 214.
15 Stark Electric Ry. Co. v. McGinty Cont. Co. (1917) 238 Fed. 657;
Ross v. Penn. Ry. (1930) 148 At. 741.
16 Canton Co. of Baltimore v. Brown (1924) 299 Fed. 147; Davis v.
Alexander (1925) 46 S. Ct. 34; Ehlers v. Bankers Fire Ins. Co. (1922) 189
N. W. 159; Finnish Temperance Society v. Publishing Co. (1921) 130 N. E.
845; Gay v. Hudson River Elec. Power Co. (1911) 187 Fed. 12; Kelley v.
Ning Yung Benevolent Ass'n. (1905) 84 Pac. 321; O'Brien v. Champlain
Const. Co. (1901) 107 Fed. 338; Old Ben Coal Co. v. Universal Coal Co.
(1929) 227 N. W. 794; Mobile & Ohio Ry. v. Barnhill (1892) 19 S. W. 21;
Radio Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Electric (1925) 7 Fed. (2) 432.
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because even in cases which do state the facts the courts may
have been influenced in part by other facts not stated. However,
there are at least thirty-eight cases of liability and twenty-two
cases of non-liability which may furnish an answer to the ques-
tion.
There are a large number of factors which the courts take
into consideration in determining whether one corporation is the
mere instrument of another.17 These might be conveniently
grouped as follows:
1. Stockholders:
a. Are the stockholders of the two corporations identical?
b. Does the parent corporation own a controlling portion of
the stock of the subsidiary or is such stock in the hands
of dummies subject to parent's control?
c. -Are the stockholders of the subsidiary inactive?
2. Directors:
a. Are the directors of the two corporations identical?
b. Are the directors of the subsidiary mere dummies sub-
ject to parent's control?
c. Are the directors of the subsidiary inactive?
3. Officers:
a. Are the officers of the two corporations identical?
b. Are the officers of the subsidiary mere dummies subject
to the parent's control?
c. Are the officers of the subsidiary inactive?
4. Employees:
a. Are the employees of the two corporations identical?
b. Are the employees of the subsidiary hired, fired, paid or
otherwise subject to control of parent?
c. Are the employees of the subsidiary inactive?
5. Property and Financing:
a. Was the subsidiary financed by the parent or by stock-
holders of parent? Or does the parent supply the funds
needed by the subsidiary for current expenses?
b. Is the property of the subsidiary subject to use by parent
at will? Or do the earnings of the subsidiary go into the
treasury of the- parent?
c. Is the subsidiary inadequaetly financed, or is it without
any separate property or bank account?
6. Books:
a. Are the books of the corporation kept by the same person?
b. Does the parent corporation keep the accounts of the
subsidiary?
127 Fletcher's Encyclopaedia of Corps., No. 43; Douglas & Shanks, Insula-
tion from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L. R. 193;
Powell, Parent & Subsidiary Corps., No. 5.
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c. Are the affairs of the subsidiary so mingled with those of
the parent on the books as not to be distinguishable?
7. Business Purpose:
a. Is the business of the two corporations identical?
b. Is the subsidiary treated as a mere branch or depart-
ment of the parent's business and does it deal almost ex-
clusively with the parent?
c. Is the subsidiary inactive?
8. Incorporators:
a. Were the two companies incorporated by the same per-
sons?
b. Did the parent corporation cause the incorporation of
the subsidiary?
9. Name:
a. Do the two corporations have substantially the same
name?
b. Does the subsidiary act and advertise in the name of
the parent?
c. Was the subsidiary entirely unknown to the plaintiff?
10. Offices:
a. Do the corporations use the same offices?
b. Are the offices of the subsidiary connected with those of
the parent and used by parent at will?
c. Does the subsidiary have no offices?
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CASE
NO. Iabc 2abc 3abc 4abc 5abc 6abc 7abc 8abc 9abc 10
1. 1 ia ........................................................ ........ ......2 1 b ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ..... I.. .......
2. 3 la ........................................... 7 b ......................
4 1 b ......................................... 7b
5 1 b ........ ................................ 7 b .... ..............
6 1 b ......... ............................... Sb. 8 b ...............
3. 7 la 2a 3a ............... ......................................
8 1 b 2 a 3 a ............... ....................... .............
9 1 a ........ 3a ........................ 7 b .........
10 1 b ........ 3 a ....a ...................................... 9 b
11 1 b . ....... 3 a ......................... ........ ................ 10
4. 12 1 b 2a 3a ........ 5a ................ .....................
13 ia 2a 3a ........ ...... ....... 7a ...... ...............
14 1 b 2a 3a ........................ 7a ........ * . . 6.
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5. 18 1 b 2a 3a ........ 5a ........ 7a ......................
19 1 b 2 b 3 b ........ 5ab ................ 8 b .............
20 1 a 2a 3a ........ ................ 9a ......
21 1 b 2a 3a ........ 5a ................ ....... 9a ......
22 1 b 2a aa ........ ............... 7 b 8 b ..............
2. 23 1 a ....................... . 5 a b ......... ..............................
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25 1 b 2 a " "... . ......
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27 1 b ........ 3 b ........ 5a ...........
28 1 b ........ 8 a......... ".. "b
...1.b ........ .a .. ..... ....... 7 b .....................29 1 b ....................... Sb............
3 1 b ........................ 5 ab ........ 7 b .....................
31 1 b ........................ 5 b ........ 7 b ................ .....
32 1. b ........ ........ ..... . ... .............. 7 b ........ ... ... ......
4.3 4 ia .2 c 3 ...... a . ............ .. .. .. .
36 1 b 2 3a . ....... a .. ... ...........................
3571b 2b.......................................b86 1 b a 3a . .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .  b .. .. .. .. .
37 i b 2 b . ... .. .. ...... ................ 7 b 8 b ........ .....
38 1 b ........ 8a 4a ........ ....... ...............
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43 1a. ........................ .a ........ 7 b ................ 10
44 1 b ........ ................ ............... 8 b 9a ......
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46 1a 3a ........ 5 b 6 b ..............................
47 la 2a 3a 5a c ........ .......... n
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50 1 b ........ 3 b 4a ........ 6 b ........................ 10
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52 la .......... ........ 4b....... 7 b ................ 10
6. 53 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 b 5ab ....... 7 b .....................
54 1 b 2a 3a 4a 5ab .................................. 10
55 1 b 2a 3a ........ 5 c 6 b 7 b ........ ............
56 1 b 2 b 3 b ........ 5a 6 b 7 b ....................
57 la 2a 3 b ........ 5abc 6 b 7 b ......................
68 ia 2a 3a 4a ab 6 b ........................ 10
59 1 b 2a 3a ........ 5ab 6a 7 b ......................
60 1 b ........ 3 c 4 b ........ 6 b 7 b I............... 10
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In the chart, page 242, the factors involved in each of the sixty
cases have been tabulated. A "factor" is an affirmative answer
to any one of the questions listed on page 240, and is evidence
that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the parent corpo-
ration. The number of the factor in the chart corresponds to
the number of the question. The number of the case in the chart
corresponds to the index number found in the list of cases on
pages 241-3. The first twenty-two cases, found above the black
line, are cases in which the parent corporation was held not
liable for the debts of the subsidiary. The last thirty-eight cases
are cases in which the parent was held liable. The cases above
and below the line are grouped according to the number of fac-
tors involved, ranging from one to five in those above the line,
and from two to six in those below it.
It will be seen from the chart that the first factor appears
in every case involving parent and subsidiary corporations, for
without it the parent-subsidiary relationship would not exist.
In most of the cases the parent itself owned stock of the sub-
sidiary. In a few the same persons owned the stock of both
corporations, which are not, strictly speaking, parent and sub-
sidiary, but they are often considered as such by the courts. In
either situation it is clear that a corporation cannot be deemed
the mere instrumentality of its stockholders merely because of
stock ownership. First of all, the management of a corporation
lies almost wholly in the hands of the directors and their agents,
the officers. The stockholders are mere investors, and they take
no part in the management other than to elect the directors
periodically and approve extraordinary proposals of the direc-
tors as to fundamental changes in the financial structure or
business purpose of the corporation. Furthermore, the primary
purpose of corporate organizations is to allow limited invest-
ment with corresponding limited liability. For these reasons
it is well settled throughout the country that one corporation
will not be liable for the debts of another merely because it
owns a controlling portion of the stock therein, or because the
same persons own a controlling portion in both. The first two
cases in the chart are examples of a large number of cases so
holding. 8
If stock ownership of itself does not result in liability, it would
seem to follow that the exercise of the rights incidental to stock
ownership will not lead to that result. Stockholders have the
absolute right to vote in the election of directors, passage of
28 Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht (1924) 238 N. Y. 254; Broderip v. Salomon
L. R. (1895) 2 Ch. 323; Minifie v. Rowley (1921) 187 Cal. 481; Continental
Securities v. Rawson (1929) 280 Pac. 954; Mid West Aid Filters Co. v.
Finn (1927) 201 Cal. 587; Richmond & I. Const. Co. v. Richmond Ry (1895)
68 Fed. 105; Ballantine on Corporations, No. 6; Cook on Corporations, No. 6.
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by-laws and other matter requiring stockholders' action in any
way they see fit, and the exercise of this right will not subject
the parent corporation to liability.
There is no other one factor which appears in all of the cases.
Looking at the chart it may be seen that factor number 3, the
situation of the officers of the subsidiary, appeared in more cases
than any other factor. Of the others it is apparent that factors
number 2, the situation of the directors, number 5, the financial
relation of the companies, and number 7, the business relation
of the companies, also are involved in most of the cases. But it
is equally apparent that these four factors occur in the cases of
non-liability as well as in the cases of liability. Furthermore,
factors number 8, the incorporation of the subsidiary, number
9, the name, and number 10, the offices used by the subsidiary,
seem to appear in cases both above and below the line. The
only factors appearing in the cases of liability and not appear-
ing in cases of non-liability are number 4, the situation of the
employees of the subsidiary, and number 6, the books of the
subsidiary. But these two factors appear in such a small num-
ber of cases that they cannot be said to be the distinguishing
factors of the liability cases. It can also be seen from the chart
that the number of factors involved has little or nothing to do
with liability, for there are cases with five factors holding the
parent not liable, and on the other hand, cases with only from
two to four factors holding the parent liable. There seems to
be no way of distinguishing the cases of liability from the cases
of non-liability, at least on the basis of the factoral set-up. For
nearly every one of the cases above the line, there may be found
one below the line involving exactly the same factors and the
same number of factors.
Now looking only at the cases below the black line, in which
the subsidiary was said to be the "mere instrumentality" of the
parent corporation, we find that factors number 3, 5 and 7
appear almost constantly. Thus we can say that where (1) the
officers of the subsidiary are the same persons as the officers of
the parent or are controlled by the officers of the parent, and(2) there is some close financial connection between the two
corporations, and (3) the subsidiary operates merely a branch
or division of the parent's business, there is very strong evi-
dence that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality, and many
courts have held that a combination of these three factors or
any two of them, plus stock ownership, is sufficient to establish
the liability of the parent. If another factor is necessary, it is
usually either (1) the fact that the directors of the subsidiary
are the same persons as those of the parent, or are controlled
by the parent, or (2) the fact that the subsidiary was incorpo-
rated by the parent. And if additional factors are needed to
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hold the subsidiary an instrumentality, any one or more of the
following may be used: (1) the fact that the two companies
use the same set of books, (2) that they use the same offices,
or (3) that the employees of the subsidiary are the same as
those of the parent or are hired, fired, paid or otherwise subject
to the control of the parent.
It seems, however, that the only conclusion one can draw from
a study of all the cases is that there is no rule or principle used
by the courts to determine whether the subsidiary is such an
instrumentality as to make the parent liable for its debts. It
seems that each case was decided almost without regard to the
other cases, and that each court had only its own vague "hunches"
to reply upon. And yet the general instrumentality rule itself
is recognized by all the authorities.
IV.
The method of the present writer has been to analyze the
facts and decisions of the pertinent cases in an attempt to dis-
cover some definite and consistent principles with which the
problem of determining when a subsidiary is an instrumentality
can be solved. Some writers on this subject used this method.
Other writers start out with a theory of their own and then
attempt to fit the cases into it, and distinguish and criticize
those which will not fit. With the cases so conflicting and vague
one would expect to find a variety of theories offered by the
writers.
Mr. Ballantine, in his book on Corporations, p. 33, and his
article in 60 Am. L. R. 17 came to the same conclusion as the
present writer, i. e., that the cases are conflicting and lay down
no rule or principle to determine when the subsidiary is an
instrumentality. However, he contends that there must be not
only the complete control by the parent over the affairs of the
subsidiary, but also fraudulent purpose in order to hold the
parent liable. By "fraudulent purpose" he means that the parent
must use the subsidiary to accomplish some wrong, intending
to escape the legal consequences by using the corporate entity
of the subsidiary as a shield. If Ballantine is correct, then the
liability of the parent company may be put in one of the other
four classes of cases mentioned by Mr. Wormser, supra p. 236,
and the "instrumentality situation" does not belong in a class
by itself.
Among the writers following the a priori method are Mr.
Douglas and Shanks. Their article is entitled "Insulation from
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations," 39 Yale L. R. 193.
Instead of trying to discover when the parent will be liable,
they approach the problem from the other angle, when will the
parent not be liable. First of all, they conclude that the com-
bination of the factors of stock ownership, directors and officers
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
will not make the parent liable. Then they say that in order
for the parent to avoid liability four things are necessary: (1)
The subsidiary must be adequately financed. (2) The everyday
business of the two companies must be kept separate and dis-
tinct so that every transaction and part of a transaction can be
identified with the one or the other. (3) The formal barriers
between the two companies must be maintained. The stock-
holders and directors must meet separately for each company.
The officers must in every transaction purport to act for one or
the other. (4) The two companies must not represent them-
selves as being part of the same company and must not allow
the public to be misled as to their independence. Douglas and
Shanks fit a number of cases into their theory and then attempt
to distinguish just as many. They finally conclude rather weakly
that the courts themselves seem to have no theory and phrase
their opinions in metaphors and vague terms such as "instru-
mentality" and "inequitable results." In that respect their con-
clusion is in accord with that of Mr. Ballantine and this writer.
However, they disagree with Mr. Ballantine and agree with Mr.
Wormser as to whether the instrumentality situation belongs in
a class by itself. They do not believe that a "fraudulent purpose"
is necessary to hold the parent liable.
Another writer adopting the a priori method is Mr. Powell,
in his recent book, "Parent and Subsidiary Corporations" (1931).
He starts with the general principle that the capacity to do
business in corporate form with its accompanying advantages
is a special privilege conferred by the state, and if the privilege
is abused, the advantages will be denied. The privilege may be
abused in one or both of two ways: (1) the management of the
subsidiary corporation may conduct its business in the interest
of the parent corporation alone rather than in the interest of
all the stockholders of the subsidiary; (2) the subsidiary may
disregard the formal procedure reuired of all corporations, as
the holding of stockholders' and directors' meetings, keeping its
own books and accounts, and acting in its own name as an inde-
pendent concern. In discussing the various factors which evi-
dence such abuse Mr. Powell agrees with Douglas and Shanks
that mere identity of stockholders, directors and officers is not
enough. And in addition, the fact that the subsidiary was origi-
nally financed by the parent is not enough because stockholders
or bondholders of a corporation are not liable for its debts. But
the appearance of any one or more of the following facts may
cause the court to decide that the subsidiary is an instrumentality
of the parent: (1) the fact that the subsidiary has not an ade-
quate amount of capital, (2) that the parent uses property of
the subsidiary as its own, (3) that the parent pays salaries and
other expenses of the subsidiary, (4) that the parent caused the
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incorporation of the subsidiary, (5) that the subsidiary has no
business except with the parent and is treated as a department
or branch of the parent.
Mr. Powell believes, along with Mr. Ballantine, that the mere
fact that the subsidiary is an instrumentality does not make
the parent liable for its debts. In addition the parent must have
made use of the subsidiary to accomplish some wrong similar
to those in the first four situations mentioned by Mr. Wormser.
So Mr. Powell apparently would not put the instrumentality rule
in a class by itself, as does Mr. Wormser.
Finally, Mr. Powell states that not only must the subsidiary
be an instrumentality and used to accomplish a wrong, but also
the wrong must result in unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff,
according to equitable principles. For example: (1) If the plain-
tiff in dealing with the subsidiary knew of all the circumstances
constituting the parent's relation with the subsidiary, he cannot
recover from the parent. (2) The parent must have been in
control of the subsidiary at the time the obligation arose; other-
wise the parent could not have caused it. (3) The remedy against
the subsidiary must be inadequate, as where it is insolvent or
has removed itself from the jurisdiction or dissolved.
A fourth writer on the subject who was able to come to some
conclusion other than that reached by the present writer is Mr.
Elson in 15 St. L. L. R. 333. He agrees with the last two that
mere identity of stockholders, directors and officers of the two
corporations will not make the parent liable. In order to hold
the parent liable three things are necessary: (1) the real parties
in interest, that is, the stockholders, mut be identical; (2) the
parent company must exercise control over the management of
the subsidiary and (3) the control must be exercised for the
benefit of the parent company and its stockholders rather than
for the benefit of the stockholders of the subsidiary, as such.
Mr. Elson apparently did not deem that the "fraudulent purpose"
or "unjust loss" was necessary, and in that respect he sides with
Mr. Wormser and Douglas and Shanks.
Another aspect of the subject on which the authorities dis-
agree is whether or not the doctrine of disregarding the entity
of the subsidiary and holding the parent liable is purely equita-
ble. Fletcher's Encyclopedia states that it is.2, Mr. Powell, in
believing that unjust loss or injury, or a so-called inequitable
result, is necessary, apparently agrees with Fletcher. Mr.
Wormser on the other hand, states that though the doctrine
may be more willingly and frequently applied in equity, it is a
legal doctrine as well.20 It seems to the present writer that
19 Fletcher, see. 41.
2012 Columbia Law Review 496.
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Mr. Wormser is clearly correct; for out of the thirty-eight cases
listed in the chart, in which the parent was held liable, not over
five were equitable actions, and all the rest were simple actions
for damages.
V.
Altogether there are six possible bases for holding the parent
company liable for any violation of duty:"' (1) The parent has
incurred the liability directly; (2) the two companies are identi-
cal in fact; (3) the parent has used the subsidiary to accomplish
some wrong; (4) the subsidiary is actually the agent of the
parent according to the established principles of agency; (5) the
subsidiary is the instrumentality of the parent; (6) the sub-
sidiary may be in fact non-existent except as a sham.
1. A corporation can incur liability directly only when its
managers, agents or servants have acted for it within the scope
of their authority or in the course of their employment. Liabil-
ity based on such ground has nothing to with the doctrine of
disregarding the corporate entity or the instrumentality rule.
But there are many cases where the manager, agents, or servants
of the parent and subsidiary corporations are identical. If the
business of the companies is distinct, there is no difficulty in
such cases in deciding whether in the particular transaction
they were acting for the parent or the subsidiary. But if the
business of the companies is all part of one enterprise and cannot
be distinguished, upon which comp'my must liability fall?
Douglas and Shanks stress the importance of transacting the
business of the two corporations separately, and are of the
opinion that if this is not done either corporation may be held
liable. That is probably the only splution to the problem.
2. It is going only one step further to hold the parent liable
on the theory that the two companies are identical in fact. All
of the factors lettered "a" in the chart are evidence of identity,
rather than control. If the stockholders, management, employees,
capital, business purpose, etc., of the two companies are sub-
stantially the same in fact, there is no good reason why the
companies themselves should not be treated as identical in law.
Of course, this theory would require the holding that the sub-
sidiary would be liable for the debts of the parent as well as
the other way around, but there is no objection to that, and it
has been so held. 22
3. It was noted earlier in this article that Mr. Wormser dis-
cusses five distinct situations where the corporate entity may
be disregarded. In the first four, apparently, the members of
21 Ballantine on Corps., p. 33. Fletcher, Encyclopaedia of Corps., No. 43.
N. Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter (1918) 250 Fed. 668.
22 In re Muncie Pulp Co. (1905) 139 Fed. 546.
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the corporation cause it to commit some wrong for their benefit
and when sued they would put up the defense that it was the
corporation's wrong, not theirs. It is clear that a parent corpo-
ration will be liable where it uses its subsidiary for such pur-
poses.
Of course a corporation will itself be liable for its own wrongs.
And ordinarily the stockholders will not be liable for its wrongs
even though it is nearly always attempting to act for their bene-
fit when it commits the wrong. On what basis then can the
stockholders be held personally liable unless the corporation was
acting under their direction and control rather than indepen-
dently of them as it is supposed to do? So in the first four situ-
ations the corporation must have been a mere instrumentality as
well as in the fifth. If so, then what distinguishes the fifth
situation, "the instrumentality situation," from the first four?
The only distinction seems to be the lack of fraudulent purpose
or wrongdoing. The subsidiary in the normal conduct of its
business incurs an ordinary contract or tort liability and the
parent is held liable for it not because it directed or caused the
commission of the wrong but merely because the subsidiary was
its instrumentality. As stated above, Mr. Powell and Mr. Ballan-
tine do not consider this a valid distinction. They think that in
order to hold the parent liable it must have used its control over
the subsidiary to cause it to commit a wrong with intention of
shielding itself behind the separate entity of the subsidiary. Mr.
Wormser, Mr. Douglas and Shanks, and Mr. Elson, on the other
hand, think otherwise. After studying the cases the present
writer is inclined to agree with the latter, for in only three cases
out of the thirty-eight cases of liability listed in the chart was
the element of fraudulent purpose involved. 23
4. It is well settled that unless prohibited by its charter or by
statute there is nothing to prevent one corporation from acting
as the agent of another.24 Liebhardt v. Wilson, 38 Colo. 1. Agency
is a relation in which one party has conferred on the other the
power to affect the legal rights and duties of the former. The
relation is ordinarily created by contract; in any event it is al-
ways consensual. But it may be implied from circumstances as
well as expressed in so many words. Therefore a parent corpora-
tion may be liable for obligations incurred by the subsidiary
where the subsidiary was acting as its agent, express or implied,
and within the scope of its authority.
Many of the courts place their decision against the corporation
on this ground,25 but usually they do not treat the situation as
23 Cases sec. 51, 50, 46.
24 6 Fletcher, Chap. 27.
25 Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Dupont (1904) 128 Fed. 840; Specht v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. (1923) 191 N. W. 905; Spokane Merchants Ass'n. v. Clere Clothing Co.
(1915) 84 Wash. 616.
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one of agency. They use the words "agency" and "instrumen-
tality" interchangeably and indiscriminately. However, Cardozo
in the well known case of Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.26 says:
"Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that
by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and
the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are
remitted to the tests of honesty and justice. The logical con-
sistency of a judicial conception will indeed be sacrificed at times,
when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted
public policy may be defended or upheld. This is so, for illus-
tration, though agency in any proper sense be lacking, where
the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will
work a fraud upon the law. At such times unity is ascribed to
parts which at least for many purposes retain an independent
life, for the reason that only thus can be overcome a perversion
of the privilege to do business in corporate form. We find in
the case at hand neither agency on the one hand, nor on the
other, abuse to be corrected by implication of a merger." Cardozo
therefore distinguishes agency from the situations where the
subsidiary is a mere instrumentality to "work a fraud upon the
law." Apparently he agrees with Powell that unless actual
agency is present the parent will not be liable unless there is a
fraudulent purpose.
Included in the cases based on the agency theory are those
cases wherein the doctrine of agency by estoppel was invoked
to hold the parent liable.
5. The theory with which this article has been most concerned
is the instrumentality theory. In other words, the parent may
be held liable for the debts of the subsidiary because the parent
has complete control over the subsidiary and of course exercises
it for its own benefit. All of the factors in the chart which are
lettered "b" are evidence of such control.
The instrumentality theory might be distinguished from the
agency theory on the ground that the relation does not arise out
of a consensual agreement. Thus says Mechem in his book on
Agency, p. 30: "Authority or power in one person to bind an-
other as his agent may be conferred without any contract be-
tween the principal and the agent, and even in some cases with-
out any actual or effective consent upon the part of the agent.
In many of these cases the alleged agent would be more properly
deemed an instrument or agency than a true agent. The com-
mand or direction of the principal to one who is subject to his
command will if acted upon suffice to bind him." However, in
spite of this minor distinction it is evident that the policy be-
hind the instrumentality theory is the same as that which caused
26 (1926) 244 N. Y. 84.
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the development of the doctrine of agency, i. e., that one should
be liable for the acts of another subject to his control and for
his benefit.
The instrumentality theory has already been distinguished
from what might be called the "fraudulent purpose" theory.
6. A final possibility for holding the parent liable exists when
the subsidiary is inactive, a mere sham, existing in name only.
It seems clear that if the parent acts in the name of the sub-
sidiary in such situations to avoid liability, it will be held liable
for any obligations incurred. All of the factors lettered "c" in
the chart are evidence of this situation. The outstanding example
of a case of this sort is number 53, Auglaize Box Board Co. v.
Hinton.
VI.
The above theories have been suggested by the writers on the
subject rather than by the courts. Sometimes the courts men-
tion in their opinions one or another of the various theories,
but for the most part they do not attempt to analyze their cases
and base their decisions on any one logical theory. Their opin-
ions are thus as vague and conflicting as their actual decisions.
At the present time, therefore, we can only say with Justice
Cardozo that "the whole problem of parent and subsidiary
corporations is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.""7
ROBERT W. YOST '36.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE-WHEN IS A FOREIGN CAUSE
OF ACTION BARRED BY LIMITATIONS IN MISSOURI?-*
In the December, 1935, number of the St. Louis Law Review,
there appeared a note by John H. Haley of the Class of 1936 on
the subject "When is a Foreign Cause of Action Barred by Limi-
tations in Missouri?" In that note Mr. Haley had occasion to
criticize adversely the decision of Judge Reeves of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in
the case of Wright v. New York Underwriters Insurance Com-
pany.' In the Wright case it was held by the court that when
an original action was commenced in Missouri on a foreign cause
of action, within the time allowed therefor by the law of the
state in which it originated, then the requirements of R. S. Mo.
27 (1926) 244 N. Y. 1. c. 94.
* Compare the views expressed in this supplementary note, with those
stated in Note, 21 St. Louis Law Rev. 43.
1 (1933) 1 Fed. Supp. 663.
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